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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

When is all of the net income derived from a business carried on by a non
exempt corporation not taxable income? This is a question engaging the best
legal talent of the commissioner of internal revenue and the Cleveland Railway
Company for a solution.
The most obvious answer is, “Never,” and this is the view taken by the
commissioner, but the corporation’s representatives do not agree with him.
While this controversy is going on, a recital of some of the underlying facts in
the case may be deemed of general interest, and they are, therefore, here set
forth.
The Cleveland Railway Company’s business is the operation of street cars
and buses in the city of Cleveland and its suburbs. Its franchise provides that
the rate of fare shall be limited to an amount that will pay operation costs plus
six per cent. on the capital invested. The cost of operation includes costs of
upkeep, depreciation, reserves for injuries to persons and properties as well as
the usual operating costs.
As these costs are subject to constant fluctuation, and as it would be im
practical to make monthly changes in the fare charged the car rider, the excess
earnings of operation are credited to an account entitled “Interest fund.”
Dividends at the prescribed rate of six per cent. per annum upon the capital
stock are paid out of this interest fund. The issuance of capital is also all
hedged about so that it can not be inflated beyond actual capital expenditures.
When the accumulation of net earnings credited to this interest fund exceeds a
certain prescribed maximum amount, the rate of fare is reduced; when the
accumulation is reduced to a certain prescribed minimum amount, the fare is
increased. These matters are all prescribed in the franchise and, therefore, are
not controllable by the company.
The commissioner looks upon all the excess earnings credited to this fund as
taxable income. The corporation argues that only the part of the fund repre
senting the six per cent. of the capital stock is taxable income, and it contends
that the remainder belongs to the car riders. Upon this premise, the corpora
tion’s attorneys argue that to impose a tax upon the excess earnings of six per
cent. is tantamount to taxing the city of Cleveland; that these excess earnings
are simply excess fares that have been collected for the car riders and are to be
returned to them by lowering the fare when such action is due as prescribed by
the franchise.
While this question is being fought out, it seems not amiss to point out the
possibility that less confusion might have arisen if the accounting nomenclature
had been more descriptive when the corporation’s books were originally revised
to conform to the provisions of the franchise.
In the first place, it is apparent that the interest fund is not a fund at all, but
partly a contingent liability and partly undivided profits. The reason it was
named “fund” was that at the beginning the corporation was required to pro
vide the initial credit to this account, and as the assets at that time included the
offsetting amount to this fund, it was presumed that it was a fund. It would

291

The Journal of Accountancy
seem not impossible to have set up accounts to segregate the contingent liability
from the undivided profits and have the proper accounts kept thereafter as the
regular monthly routine. If this had been done it would seem to us, at least,
that there would have been no more probability of interpreting this excess
collection of fares as income than there is in considering the liability for out
standing tickets as income.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Appreciation in the value of property received as a gift, to the extent of the
difference between the value when received and the price for which sold, is
taxable under the act of 1913.
A claim for interest on the portion of over-assessment refunded before suit
for refund on the entire amount was brought, will not lie, where no claim for
refund was made prior to the suit for refund and the original pleadings did not
contain a claim for refund and were not amended to embody such claim during
the trial. (Circuit court of appeals, John Barnett Rice v. Mark Eisner.)
Section 240 (b) of act of 1918, requiring a consolidated return in certain cases,
is constitutional, and the term “substantially all the stock” is sufficiently
definite. (United States district court, W. D., Pennsylvania, United States v.
Harry Whyel and George Whyel.)
Income of lessee of oil lands of Osage Indians may not be taxed as he is the
government’s agent in operating its ward’s land, and as general acts of congress
do not apply to Indians unless such intention is clearly manifested. (Circuit
court of appeals, third circuit, Lewellyn, former collector, v. The Colonial Trust
Co., executor.)
Taxes collected under threat of distraint after statutory period of limitations
may be recovered by taxpayer. (United States district court, W. D. Kentucky,
Ten Broeck Type Co. v. Robert H. Lucas, collector.)
Suit for refund may not be brought unless timely claim has been filed with
the commissioner under sections 1112 and 1113, and government is not estopped
to assert limitations by statements of revenue agent. (United States district
court, W. D. Pennsylvania, Daniel Ritter v. United States.)
United States need not secure judgment against a dissolved corporation be
fore proceeding against stockholders to recover income and profits taxes, al
though state laws permit such a judgment, since judgment would be useless.
(United States district court, S. D., New York, United States v. Fairall et al.)
Doubts both as to law and facts, must be resolved in favor of taxpayer, and
the evidence was held insufficient to prove a transfer in contemplation of death
or to take effect at death. (United States district court, S. D. California, Mary
B. Norris and Luch B. Ross v. Goodcell, collector.)
TREASURY RULING
(T.D. 3979, February 12, 1927)
Article 1523: Personal-service corporations.
Income and excess-profits taxes—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of
court of claims
1. Corporations—Personal Service
A corporation engaged in selling goods on commission is not
entitled to be taxed under section 303 of the revenue act of 1918
unless the business can be segregated into distinctly separate units,
one a personal-service unit as defined in section 200 and the others
employing capital.
2. Same—Evidence
The record must furnish convincing proof that the alleged per
sonal-service branch is capable of distinct separation from its other
sources of income and meets exactly the requirements of section
200.
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3. Capital—Guarantee—Accounts
The guaranteeing of customer’s accounts whereby payment for
purchases made is secured involves the employment of capital.
4. Same—Regulations
Article 1529 of Regulations 45, denying personal-service classi
fication unless at least 80 per cent. of the stock of the company is
held by those regularly engaged in the active conduct of its affairs,
is approved.
The following decision of the United States court of claims in the case of
J. H. Lane & Co., Inc., v. United States is published for the information of in
ternal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Court of Claims of the United States
J. H. Lane & Co., Inc., a corporation, v. The United States
[December 6, 1926]
OPINION

Booth, judge, delivered the opinion of the court.
The action in this case is the result of differences of opinion between the
plaintiff and the commissioner of internal revenue as to the sections of the
internal-revenue laws of 1918 and 1919 under which the plaintiff’s income,
war, and excess-profits tax should be computed. No jurisdictional questions
are involved and the amount in dispute is $322,079.16. The case is one of
importance.
The revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat., 1059) provides in part as follows:
“The term ‘personal-service corporation’ means a corporation whose income
is to be ascribed primarily to the activities of the principal owners or stock
holders who are themselves regularly engaged in the active conduct of the
affairs of the corporation and in which capital (whether invested or borrowed)
is not a material income-producing factor; but does not include any foreign
corporation, nor any corporation 50 per centum or more of whose gross income
consists either (1) of gains, profits or income derived from trading as a prin
cipal, or (2) of gains, profits, commissions, or other income, derived from a
government contract or contracts made between April 6, 1917, and November
11, 1918, both dates inclusive.”

Section 303 of the same law (40 Stat., 1089) is as follows:
“That if part of the net income of a corporation is derived (1) from a trade
or business (or a branch of a trade or business) in which the employment of
capital is necessary, and (2) a part (constituting not less than 30 per centum
of its total net income) is derived from a separate trade or business (or a
distinctly separate branch of the trade or business) which if constituting the
sole trade or business would bring it within the class of ‘personal-service cor
porations,’ then (under regulations prescribed by the commissioner with the
approval of the secretary) the tax upon the first part of such net income shall
be separately computed (allowing in such computation only the same propor
tionate part of the credits authorized in sections 311 and 312), and the tax
upon the second part shall be the same percentage thereof as the tax so com
puted upon the first part is of such first part: Provided, that the tax upon such
second part shall in no case be less than 20 per centum thereof, unless the tax
upon the entire net income, if computed without benefit of this section, would
constitute less than 20 per centum of such entire net income, in which event
the tax shall be determined upon the entire net income, without reference to
this section, as other taxes are determined under this title. The total tax
computed under this section shall be subject to the limitations provided in
section 302.”
The plaintiff is a New York corporation with a paid-up capital stock of
$1,400,000, divided into 14,000 shares of the par value of $100 each. Its place
of business is New York City. The business of the plaintiff from which it
derives income is conducted in the following manner: With 23 cotton mills it
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has contracts to sell their output upon the basis of a commission of 4 per cent.
of the purchase price. With a few of the mills the contracts are in writing;
with the others it is not so; but the plaintiff concedes that for all the mills
its obligations are identical—whether in writing or oral. At the beginning of
a season when markets for the mills’ products are available the mills quote to
the plaintiff their fixed prices. From these prices plaintiff may not deviate.
The plaintiff, through its organization, finds the buyers, and from them ob
tains contracts to purchase. Contracts of purchase were made out in triplicate,
one copy for the purchaser, one for the mills and one for the plaintiff.
The goods embraced within a contract of purchase were shipped directly
from the mills to the purchaser, the plaintiff being advised of this fact. Pay
ments for the merchandise so shipped were made to the plaintiff and by it
remitted, less commission, to the mills, the plaintiff guaranteeing to the mills
the payment in full of the purchase price. The terms of sale fixed by the mills
were usually cash, with an allowed discount of 2 per cent. if paid within 10 days
from receipt of shipment. The plaintiff in the course of its dealings with the
purchasers quite frequently advanced to them a sufficient sum of money to
pay their bills and either taking advantage of the 2 per cent. discount allowed
or charging interest for the advancement. Sometimes it so happened that a
purchaser of the product of the mills required merchandise of a character the
mills could not supply. In order to meet this emergency the plaintiff went
into the open market, procured the desired merchandise, and itself sold it to
the purchaser at a profit.
The mills on occasions needed financial assistance at the beginning of a
season. When so in need the plaintiff loaned to them the sums sought and
collected interest for the loan. The plaintiff also derived income from stock
investments, liberty-loan bonds, and interest upon bank deposits.
The plaintiff is a close corporation, its stockholders of a limited number, in
virtue of an express agreement between them whereby an option to purchase
is granted to the remaining members in the event of the death or voluntary
retirement of an owner. Its stock is not listed on the stock exchange and not
offered for public sale. Fourteen stockholders owned an aggregate of 70 per
cent. of the capital stock, and it is conceded by the defendant that the owners
of 0.662 of the stock in 1918 and 0.744 in 1919 were regularly engaged in the
active conduct of its business.
Plaintiff seeks, for taxation purposes, classification under section 303
(supra) as a part personal-service corporation in which invested capital is not
a material income-producing factor and a part capitalized corporation in which
invested capital is not only employed but necessary. In order to meet the
requirements of the statute plaintiff contends that its business activities are
capable of distinct separation into distinct branches of a trade or business, and
proof is adduced to support an allegation that the corporation is divided into
the following distinct and separate branches, viz:
“1. Personal-service branch, not requiring the use of capital, to wit: Sell
ing as agent on a commission. 2. Buying and selling on its own account, i. e.,
trading. 3. Interest received upon advances to mills. 4. Unearned or for
feited discounts. 5. Interest on bank deposits. 6. Allocation of part income
to guarantee feature of its contracts.”
It is to be observed that all of the alleged separate branches require the use
of invested capital. As to the alleged personal-service branch, the argument
is that the small allocation of invested capital to this activity is not a material
income-producing factor. Invested capital performs a necessary and indis
pensable part in producing income as to the remaining branches.
The plaintiff’s system of accounting, reflected in bookkeeping, disclosed the
income received from its various sources, but did not disclose an allocation of
invested capital to any one or more of its alleged branches. Prior to making its
claim for a refund of taxes claiming an assessment on the basis set out therein,
an expert tax accountant was employed, and to him the plaintiff exhibited
its correct accounts, showing gross income from each source, and from these
figures the accountant allocated $1,089,913.30 for 1918 and $1,595,159.72
for 1919 of plaintiff’s net income to business in which invested capital was not
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a material income-producing factor and $445,375.77 for 1918 and $433,309.11
for 1919 to business requiring the use of invested capital, allocating $100,000
of the plaintiff’s invested capital to its alleged personal-service branch and the
entire balance to its alleged branches requiring capital.
Section 303 (supra) is not a tax-exempting statute. It is no more than a
legislative recognition of the existence of corporations wherein personal service
and invested capital do each produce income capable of segregation. Dis
tinctly personal-service corporations were entirely exempt from income taxation
under section 200 (supra), and congress extended to corporations, wherein its
personal-service branch was distinct and separate from a branch or branches
of its trade employing invested capital, a substantial reduction in rate rather
than total exemption from income taxation.
The defendant first challenges the plaintiff’s contention with an assertion
that it was not engaged in a trade or business having separate and distinct
branches within the meaning of section 303 of the revenue act of 1918. The
question is a vital one.
The record must furnish convincing proof that the alleged personal-service
branch of the plaintiff’s business is capable of distinct separation from its
other sources of income and meets exactly the requirements of section 200
(supra) of the revenue law defining a personal-service corporation. The
interposed defense may only be overcome by sufficient proof that the income
allocated to the personal-service feature is due primarily to the activities of
the principal owners or stockholders regularly engaged in the active conduct
of the affairs of the corporation and not to invested capital to any material
extent. That this is obvious and indispensable appears from the express pro
visions of section 303, wherein congress, in pointing out the degree of segrega
tion necessary to establish a personal-service branch of a corporation, uses this
language:
“A separate trade or business (or a distinctly separate branch of the trade
or business) which if constituting the sole trade or business would bring it
within the class of ‘personal-service corporations.’”
The plaintiff’s organization and single business enterprise was to earn income
through commissions on sales of merchandise—a commission house. When
incorporated it capitalized for $1,400,000. In 1918 its conceded statutory in
vested capital was $2,623,271.37. In 1919 it had attained the amount of
$3,019,192.04. Therefore, it is indisputably evident from the plaintiff’s own
record that the corporation, when incorporated, regarded capital as necessary
to its business, and subsequent events have demonstrated the wisdom of its
presence. Manifestly it was not the intention of the corporation to depend
upon the personal service of its stockholders exclusively for returns from its
business as a whole. Having at all times available an abundance of capital,
the plaintiff was able to adopt a business policy whereby as an intermediary
between the mills, its chief source of income, and its customers, to whom it
sold their products, it could with profit extend accommodations, sporadic and
temporary favors, incidental to and directly connected with the main object of
its incorporation, and thereby retain the trade of both angles of its business,
and supplement the same with additional customers.
The plaintiff did not hold itself out to the business world as a money lender,
nor as a merchandising corporation. It did not deal with the public generally
in this respect. To its own customers, a limited class from whom it derived
its substantial and yearly income by way of commissions, it extended these
accommodations, and to no others. There is no evidence in the record that the
plaintiff cultivated this alleged special trade, nor maintained separate and
distinct organizations to attend to it. True, as plaintiff’s commission busi
ness expanded, this source of income expanded along with it, an incidental
development, one that follows naturally from the inseparable connection of
the two. As one grew the other grew in proportion thereto. The plaintiff was
and is essentially a commission house, not dependent upon the personal service
of its stockholders exclusively for income, but combining therewith invested
capital of sufficient proportions to single it out from a distinct and purely per
sonal-service corporation, and attract to it business a corporation not so

situated might be unable to obtain.
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The so-called branches of its business, so sedulously insisted upon, were not,
within the contemplation of the revenue law, separate and distinct enter
prises; they were, as the defendant observes, “sources of income,” incidental
activities, suggested by and inseparably a part of a commission business, the
identical activities which in the very nature of the enterprise in hand would
suggest themselves to a sagacious manager of a commission house. In keep
ing its books it never occurred to the plaintiff that its business embraced five
distinct and separate branches, for its accounts were not so kept, and it re
quired the services of an expert to make an allocation of income thereto. The
plaintiff treated the various features of its business policy as merely supple
mental and subsidiary to its unified business purpose.
The plaintiff’s contention is vulnerable in this respect from other points
of view. It is admitted that the guarantee given by the plaintiff to the mills,
whereby payment for purchases made is secured, involves the employment of
capital. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff’s expert ascribes $266,512 in 1918
and $266,929.88 as commission income derived from this source. The basis for
this conclusion is one-half of 1 per centum of plaintiff’s total sales made for
the mills less the total of its merchandise sales and a special commission
included therein. Possibly this computation is the best obtainable under the
circumstances, but clearly it is hypothetical, and along with the allocation of
$100,000 of the company’s invested capital to the commission business more or
less arbitrary. A sound financial commission house obligates itself to guar
antee some of its customers against loss. The customers thus guaranteed
patronize the concern to the extent of very large sums, from which the corpo
ration realizes most substantial profits in commissions.
Is it within the range of exact computation or even measurably accurate
estimates to proportion in dollars and cents the amount of income chargeable
alone to this business policy? We think not. Is it logical to conclude that an
obligation thus assumed in some instances in the written contracts, which in
terms fixes the commissions to be paid for the service to be rendered, and the
corresponding obligations of the broker, that the plaintiff was segregating its
commission business into branches, one of which was this guarantee? The
mills turned over their products to the plaintiff to sell for them, induced in
part so to do because they could rest secure in the knowledge that the pur
chase price would be paid to them, if not by the purchaser then by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff did not have written contracts with many of the mills, and much
is made of this fact; but irrespective of this, the plaintiff dealt with all of its
customers on the same basis and observed this obligation, whether in writing
or otherwise. Of exactly the same nature and consequence was the plaintiff's
policy of loaning money to its customers to whom it sold the products of the
mills. To retain both the mills and the purchasers was essential to its enter
prise.
The plaintiff purchased cotton goods in the open market and held them for
sale to such of its customers as could not fully supply their needs from the
mills. In this respect the plaintiff acted upon its own account, and doubtless
instituted the policy to maintain a relationship with the purchasers whereby
they could be assured that all their business needs could be supplied by the
plaintiff and thus forestall the necessity of patronizing other commission
houses. Assuredly the income realized from this source designates it as a
mere adjunct to the plaintiff’s main efforts. The plaintiff under no possible
circumstances depended upon this source of income for profits. It was not
setting itself up as a mercnandising corporation or a part merchandising and
part personal service. The intended purpose was to retain patronage to the
end of realizing profits from personal service, the adoption of business policies
sufficiently attractive to bring to the company its large and growing commis
sion business.
It is hardly necessary to indulge comment upon the remaining alleged
branches of the plaintiff’s business. Interest on government bonds and on
bank deposits classify themselves. The language of the statute, evidenced by
the precision with which it speaks, seems to clearly exclude from its terms a
corporation whose business may not be segregated into the distinctly separate

296

Income-tax Department
units, one a personal-service unit under section 200 and the others employing
capital.
It is scarcely probable that congress was intending to reach a corporation
so organized that the division and allocation of its income to its various
activities depend upon arbitrary, obscure and hypothetical computations.
To a situation wherein the plaintiff concedes that the allocations made are
more favorable to the government than to the plaintiff, a concession which
admits inaccuracy, certainly the government has no lawful right to exact
more than is lawfully due. The revenue law requires a degree of certainty,
to say the least. Surely congress was not providing for doubtful situations
and extremely technical cases. A separate trade or business or a distinctly
separate branch of the trade or business ought not, under ordinary circum
stances, be difficult to identify. In the first enumeration the way is clear.
In the second the word “distinctly” imports a trade or business disconnected
with any other distinct trade or business making up the enterprise. It does not
include the adoption of a concerted business policy of a corporation, employ
ing various activities incidental to and inseparably intertwined with its main
business, the purpose of which is to attain the success of the principal and
unified business of the corporation.
The mere fact that income accrues from the activities so mentioned is not
of itself sufficient to sustain a separate and distinct branch of the business.
The income, like the activity, is incidental. It is not the source from which the
corporation contemplates its real profits from which to pay dividends and
accumulate a surplus. On the contrary, it is but a contributing factor toward
the maintenance and support of the business the corporation was originally
organized to conduct. In other words, within the plaintiff’s own prescribed
circle all the resources at its command were utilized to and did develop a
most successful brokerage business, the identical and single object of its in
corporation. As was said by the court in Matteson Co. v. Willcuts (12 Fed.
(2nd), 447):
"... Every corporation has full control of its own activities. It knows
what the requirements of a personal-service corporation are. It may comply
therewith and easily keep within the limits thereof if it so choose, or it may
not if it otherwise prefers. If it does not fairly observe and keep within the
requirements of the law, it should not claim the benefits which the law confers.
To nearly comply with the law, or to come within hailing distance thereof, is
not enough.”
A pointed illustration of a corporation engaged in distinct and separate
branches of a trade or business is found in the following cases: Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States (259 U. S. 296 [T. D. 3356, C. B. I-2,
347]); Malley v. Old Colony Trust Co. (299 Fed., 523, 527).
Article 1525, regulations of the commissioner, reads as follows:
“In order that a corporation may be deemed to be a personal-service cor
poration its earnings must be derived principally from compensation for per
sonal services rendered by the corporation to the persons with whom it does
business. Merchandising or trading either directly or indirectly in commodi
ties or the services of others is not rendering personal service. Conducting
an auction, agency, brokerage or commission business strictly on the basis of
a fee or commission is rendering personal service. If, however, the corpora
tion assumes any such risks as those of market fluctuation, bad debts, failure
to accept shipments, etc., or if it guarantees the accounts of the purchaser or
is in any way responsible to the seller for the payment of the purchase price,
the transaction is one of merchandising or trading, and this is true even
though the goods are shipped directly from the producer to the consumer and
are never actually in the possession of the corporation. The fact that earnings
of the corporation are termed commissions or fees is not controlling. The
fact that a commission or fee is based on a difference in the prices at which
the seller sells and the buyer buys raises a presumption that the transaction
is one of merchandising or trading, and it will be so considered in the absence
of satisfactory evidence to the contrary.”
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The remaining obstacle to plaintiff’s right of recovery, as disclosed by the
record, is found in the fact that it is not entitled in any event to classification
as a personal-service corporation within the terms of section 200 of the revenue
law—i. e., the plaintiff’s alleged commission branch, even if it constituted its
sole business, does not meet the requirements of the law. Section 200 (supra)
of the revenue law prescribes three positive essentials before a corporation
may be classified as one depending upon personal service for its income: (1)
The principal owners or stockholders must be regularly engaged in the active
conduct of the affairs of the corporation, (2) the corporation’s income must be
ascribed primarily to the activities of such principal owners or stockholders,
and (3) capital must not be a material income-producing factor.
The defendant concedes, as shown in finding XV, that the principal owners
of 0.662 in 1918 and 0.744 in 1919 of the plaintiff’s capital stock were regularly
engaged in the active conduct of the affairs of the corporation. Article 1529
of the commissioner of internal revenue regulations provides:
“No definite percentage of stock or interest in the corporation which must
be held by those engaged in the active conduct of its affairs in order that they
may be deemed to be the principal owners or stockholders can be prescribed
as a conclusive test, as other facts may affect any presumption so established.
No corporation or its owners or stockholders shall, however, make a return in
the first instance on the basis of its being a personal-service corporation unless
at least 80 per cent. of its stock is held by those regularly engaged in the
active conduct of its affairs.”
It declines the receipt of a corporation’s return, in the first instance, on the
basis of personal-service classification unless at least 80 per cent. of its stock is
held by those regularly engaged in the active conduct of its affairs. The
plaintiff vigorously assails the validity of the foregoing regulations, asserts it
to be unwarranted and arbitrary, contrary to the statute, and an apparent
attempt to engraft terms into the law omitted by congress. With this con
tention we are disinclined to agree. The inherent structure of a personal
service corporation, one within the terms of the statute, compels an active and
regular service from its principal owners or stockholders. The statute itself
fixes limitations; “principal owners or stockholders” certainly contemplates
that a personal-service corporation must depend upon income from service from
this source.
Stockholders may not profit from its return without distinct contribution in
active service to their production. How this shall be ascertained is not
definitely set forth in section 200 (supra), but in section 303 (supra), the act
under which plaintiff claims, it is expressly provided that the tax imposed
shall be computed “under regulations prescribed by the commissioner with the
approval of the secretary.” The supreme court said, in United States v.
Grimaud (220 U. S., 506, 520):
“The legislature can not delegate its power to make a law, but it can make
a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make its own action depend. To deny this
would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon
which wise and useful legislation must depend which can not be known to the
lawmaking power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determina
tion outside of the halls of legislation.”
In addition, the regulation challenged does not irrevocably fix as a deter
minative factor a specific percentage of stock ownership. The bureau rec
ognizes that the statute does not definitely refer to any fixed figures as a con
clusive test in this respect, and all that regulation itself does is to provide for
“first instance” return, leaving open the question of final determination and
an avenue for other contentions and claims.
The plaintiff’s income is not to be ascribed primarily to the activities of its
principal stockholders. On the contrary, as heretofore discussed, invested and
borrowed capital played an exceedingly important part in producing returns.
It would be more than difficult to hold, in view of the findings, that without
the large sums of invested capital constantly available the personal service of

the stockholders would have resulted in the income realized. That the in
298

Income-tax Department
vested capital of plaintiff’s company was a material income-producing factor is
not alone disclosed in the preceding discussion, but clearly appears from the
income realized from this source.
The purpose of exempting a strictly personal-service corporation from income
taxes was to place them in a similar status with partnerships so engaged.
Congress, by section 303, in extending a limited exemption to a part personal
service and a part capitalized corporation, carefully circumscribed the privilege,
by entailing upon the corporation claiming it the positive necessity of a dis
tinct separation of its personal-service branch from its other branches in such
a way as to meet the statutory requirements of section 200. However difficult
it may be to segregate a going business concern into the parts required, it must
be done if the right is to prevail. There are no border-line cases. They must
be within or without the law. Industrial corporations employ capital, and if
they combine as separate and distinct a personal-service business along with
the other business operations, the scope of activities must be capable of being
broken up into units and not overlap, so that the commissioner of internal
revenue may not have non-solvable difficulties in untangling one from the other.
The principal owners or stockholders, it seems to us, are required to give
substantially all their time to the personal-service branch. Capital is to be an
unimportant factor employed in a merely incidental way toward the pay
ment of overhead expenses and not yielding appreciable income. Why, in this
very case, if we are to accept the computations offered by the plaintiff, $100,000
of a statutory invested capital of $3,019,192.04 is allocated to the commission
business yielding an annual profit in excess of $1,600,000 yearly, averaging at
least 72 per centl of the plaintiff’s total net income, and the remaining $2,919,
192.04 of invested capital allocated to branches producing not to exceed 28
per cent. of its total net income. The growth of the plaintiff’s commission
business, the company’s goodwill and financial status in the business world is,
it seems to us, a complete refutation that it was aught else than a commission
house, employing its substantial capital in its commission business.
It follows that the petition should be dismissed. And it is so ordered.
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